Google Inc. is an American public corporation, earning revenue from advertising related to its Internet search, e-mail, online mapping, office productivity, social networking, and video sharing services as well as selling advertising-free versions of the same technologies. The Google headquarters, the Googleplex, is located in Mountain View, California. As of December 31, 2008, the company has 20,222 full-time employees.[3]
Google was co-founded by Larry Page and Sergey Brin while they were students at Stanford University and the company was first incorporated as a privately held company on September 4, 1998. The initial public offering took place on August 19, 2004, raising US$1.67 billion, making it worth US$23 billion. Google has continued its growth through a series of new product developments, acquisitions, and partnerships. Environmentalism, philanthropy and positive employee relations have been important tenets during the growth of Google, the latter resulting in being identified multiple times as Fortune Magazine's #1 Best Place to Work.[4] The unofficial company slogan is "Don't be evil", although criticism of Google includes concerns regarding the privacy of personal information, copyright, censorship and discontinuation of services. According to Millward Brown, it is the most powerful brand in the world.[
Friday, February 20, 2009
Currency pair
A currency pair depicts a quotation of two different currencies. The first currency in the pair is the base currency or transaction currency. The second currency in the pair is labelled quote currency, payment currency or counter currency. Such a quotation depicts how many units of the counter currency are needed to buy one unit of the base currency.
For example the quotation EUR/USD 1.2500 means that one euro is exchanged for 1.25 US dollar. If the quote moves from EUR/USD 1.2500 to EUR/USD 1.2510, the euro is getting stronger and the dollar weaker. On the other hand if the EUR/USD quote moves from 1.2500 to 1.2490 the euro is getting weaker while the dollar is getting stronger.
For example the quotation EUR/USD 1.2500 means that one euro is exchanged for 1.25 US dollar. If the quote moves from EUR/USD 1.2500 to EUR/USD 1.2510, the euro is getting stronger and the dollar weaker. On the other hand if the EUR/USD quote moves from 1.2500 to 1.2490 the euro is getting weaker while the dollar is getting stronger.
Foreign currency mortgage
A foreign currency mortgage is a mortgage which is repayable in a currency other than the currency of the country in which the borrower is a resident. Foreign currency mortgages can be used to finance both personal mortgages and corporate mortgages.
The interest rate charged on a Foreign currency mortgage is based on the interest rates applicable to the currency in which the mortgage is denominated and not the interest rates applicable to the borrower's own domestic currency. Therefore, a Foreign currency mortgage should only be considered when the interest rate on the foreign currency is significantly lower than the borrower can obtain on a mortgage taken out in his or her domestic currency.
Borrowers should bear in mind that ultimately they have a liability to repay the mortgage in another currency and currency exchange rates constantly change. This means that if the borrower's domestic currency was to strengthen against the currency in which the mortgage is denominated, then it would cost the borrower less in domestic currency to fully repay the mortgage. Therefore, in effect, the borrower makes a capital saving.
Conversely, if the exchange rate of borrowers domestic currency were to weaken against the currency in which the mortgage is denominated, then it would cost the borrower more in their domestic currency to repay the mortgage. Therefore, the borrower makes a capital loss.
When the value of the mortgage is large, it may be possible to reduce or limit the risk in the exchange exposure by hedging
The interest rate charged on a Foreign currency mortgage is based on the interest rates applicable to the currency in which the mortgage is denominated and not the interest rates applicable to the borrower's own domestic currency. Therefore, a Foreign currency mortgage should only be considered when the interest rate on the foreign currency is significantly lower than the borrower can obtain on a mortgage taken out in his or her domestic currency.
Borrowers should bear in mind that ultimately they have a liability to repay the mortgage in another currency and currency exchange rates constantly change. This means that if the borrower's domestic currency was to strengthen against the currency in which the mortgage is denominated, then it would cost the borrower less in domestic currency to fully repay the mortgage. Therefore, in effect, the borrower makes a capital saving.
Conversely, if the exchange rate of borrowers domestic currency were to weaken against the currency in which the mortgage is denominated, then it would cost the borrower more in their domestic currency to repay the mortgage. Therefore, the borrower makes a capital loss.
When the value of the mortgage is large, it may be possible to reduce or limit the risk in the exchange exposure by hedging
Karachi Stock Exchange
The Karachi Stock Exchange or KSE is a stock exchange located in Karachi, Sindh, Pakistan. Founded in 1947, it is Pakistan's largest and oldest stock exchange, with many Pakistani as well as overseas listings. Its current premises are situated on Stock Exchange Road, in the heart of Karachi's Business District.
Foreign direct investment in Romania
(FDI) in Romania has increased dramatically. In 2006 net foreign direct investment was inbound US$12 billion (EUR 9.1 billion). Cheap and skilled labor force, low taxes, a 16% flat tax for corporations and individuals, no dividend taxes, liberal labor code and a favorable geographical location are Romania’s main advantages for foreign investors. FDI has grown by 600% since 2000 to around $13.6 billion or $2,540 per capita by the end of 2004. In October 2005 new investment stimuli introduced – more favorable conditions to IT and research centers, especially to be located in the east part of the country (where is more unemployment), to bring more added value and not to be logistically demanding.
American monetary hegemony
The end of WWII witnessed the recentralization of monetary power in the hands of a United States that had become willing to carry the burden of postwar reconstruction. The United States had emerged from WWII with the ideals of economic interdependence, accountability, and altruism, expressed in the vision of universal multilateralism (above all, multilateralism simply meant nondiscrimination via the elimination or reduction of barriers and obstacles to trade, but more importantly was the maintenance of barriers “that were difficult to apply in a nondiscriminatory manner” (Ruggie, 1982, p. 213)). In essence, the term multilateralism differs today, compared to what it meant after WWII. US interests in a multilateral, liberal world economy would not only be grounded entirely in idealistic internationalism. There was the cold, calculating necessity of generating a US export surplus. This would obviate government spending, stimulate the domestic economy, substitute for domestic investment, and avert reorganization for certain industries in the economy that were overbuilt during the war effort. For these reasons the “idea of an export surplus took on a special importance” (Block, 1977, p.35) for the US. The production of an export surplus was therefore intimately connected with establishing a world economy that was free of imperial systems, as well as bilateral payments and trading systems. The US would therefore aim to open its predecessor’s empire to American trade and to garner British compliance to create its postwar monetary system through financial leverage, namely the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of 1945.
This new vision of universal multilateralism was, however, forestalled by the new economic realities of a war-torn Europe, symbolized by Britain’s financial inability to maintain sterling convertibility. Combined with this new economic reality, was the political-military threat of the Soviet Union. On December 29, 1945, only two days before the expiration of Bretton Woods, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslave Molotov notified George Kennan, “that for the amount [offered] the U.S.S.R. would not subscribe to the articles” (James et al., 1994, p. 617). Two months later, in February 1946, Kennan sent his famous telegram to Washington, which inquired into why the U.S.S.R. had not ratified the Bretton Woods Agreement. The telegram would later be regarded as the beginning of US Cold War policy (James et al., 1994).
The US thus altered its vision from universal multilateralism to regional multilateralism, which it would promote in Europe through the Marshall Plan, the European Recovery Program (ERP), and the European Payments Union (EPU). With the dissolution of the EPU came the prospect of a real multilateral world as the Bretton Woods monetary system came into effect in 1958. The same year marked the beginning of a permanent US balance of payments deficits.
This new vision of universal multilateralism was, however, forestalled by the new economic realities of a war-torn Europe, symbolized by Britain’s financial inability to maintain sterling convertibility. Combined with this new economic reality, was the political-military threat of the Soviet Union. On December 29, 1945, only two days before the expiration of Bretton Woods, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslave Molotov notified George Kennan, “that for the amount [offered] the U.S.S.R. would not subscribe to the articles” (James et al., 1994, p. 617). Two months later, in February 1946, Kennan sent his famous telegram to Washington, which inquired into why the U.S.S.R. had not ratified the Bretton Woods Agreement. The telegram would later be regarded as the beginning of US Cold War policy (James et al., 1994).
The US thus altered its vision from universal multilateralism to regional multilateralism, which it would promote in Europe through the Marshall Plan, the European Recovery Program (ERP), and the European Payments Union (EPU). With the dissolution of the EPU came the prospect of a real multilateral world as the Bretton Woods monetary system came into effect in 1958. The same year marked the beginning of a permanent US balance of payments deficits.
British monetary hegemony
Great Britain rose to the status of monetary hegemon in 1871 with widespread adoption of the gold standard. During the gold standard of the late nineteenth century, Britain became the greatest exporter of financial capital. Its capital city, London, also became center of the world gold, money, and financial markets. This was a major reason for states adopting the gold standard. In order for Paris, Berlin, and other financial centers to attract the lucrative financial business from London, it was necessary to emulate Britain’s gold standard, for it reduced transaction costs, represented creditworthiness, and sound financial policy from government (Schwartz, 1996). The city of London was the leading supplier of both short term and long term credit, which was channeled abroad. Its extensive financial facilities provided cheap credit, which enhanced the strength of the pound through deepening its use for international payments. According to Walter (1991), during the decades of 1870-1913, “sterling bills and short-term credits financed perhaps 60 percent of world trade” (p. 88).
Britain’s foreign investment cultivated foreign economies for the use of sterling. In 1850, Britain’s net overseas assets grew from 7 percent of the stock of net national wealth to 14 percent in 1870, and to around 32 percent in 1913 (Edelstein, 1994). The world had never before seen one nation committing so much of its national income and savings to foreign investment. Britain’s foreign lending practices possessed two technical aspects that gave greater credence to the prominence of sterling as a unit of storage and medium of exchange: first, British loans to foreigners were made in sterling, which allowed the borrowing country to service the debt more conveniently with its sterling reserves, and second, Britain’s use of written instructions to pay or bill exchanges were drawn in London to finance international trade
More importantly, its unrivalled ability to run current account deficits through the issuance of its unquestioned currency and its discount rate endowed Britain with a special privilege. The effects of the discount rate had a “controlling influence on Britain’s balance of payments regardless of what other central banks were doing” (Cleveland, 1976, p. 17). When other central banks engaged in a tug of war over international capital flows, “the Bank of England could tug the hardest” (Eichengreen, 1985, p. 6). In this regard, British monetary hegemony was seldom threatened by crises of convertibility for its gold reserves were insulated by the discount rate and all foreign rates followed the British rate. The prominence of London’s credit drains led Keynes (1930) to write that the sway of London “on credit conditions throughout the world was so predominant that the Bank of England could almost have claimed to be the conductor of the international orchestra” (p. 306-307). Karl Polanyi in his renowned work the Great Transformation states “Pax Britannica held its sway sometimes by the ominous poise of heavy ship’s cannon, but more frequently it prevailed by the timely pull of a thread in the international monetary network” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 24).
Britain’s position waned due to inter-state competition, insufficient domestic investment, and World War I. Despite its economic weaknesses, British political sway continued after WWI, which led to the gold-exchange standard created under the Genoa Conference of 1922. This system failed, however, not only due to Britain’s incapability, but to the growing decentralization of the international monetary system with the rise of New York and Paris as financial centers that resulted in the collapse of the gold exchange standard in 1931. The Gold Exchange standard of the interwar period, as Kindleberger cogently stated, collapsed because "Britain couldn't and America wouldn't." In fact, Kindleberger provides a slightly different variation of monetary hegemony that possesses five functions rather than three defined here.
Britain’s foreign investment cultivated foreign economies for the use of sterling. In 1850, Britain’s net overseas assets grew from 7 percent of the stock of net national wealth to 14 percent in 1870, and to around 32 percent in 1913 (Edelstein, 1994). The world had never before seen one nation committing so much of its national income and savings to foreign investment. Britain’s foreign lending practices possessed two technical aspects that gave greater credence to the prominence of sterling as a unit of storage and medium of exchange: first, British loans to foreigners were made in sterling, which allowed the borrowing country to service the debt more conveniently with its sterling reserves, and second, Britain’s use of written instructions to pay or bill exchanges were drawn in London to finance international trade
More importantly, its unrivalled ability to run current account deficits through the issuance of its unquestioned currency and its discount rate endowed Britain with a special privilege. The effects of the discount rate had a “controlling influence on Britain’s balance of payments regardless of what other central banks were doing” (Cleveland, 1976, p. 17). When other central banks engaged in a tug of war over international capital flows, “the Bank of England could tug the hardest” (Eichengreen, 1985, p. 6). In this regard, British monetary hegemony was seldom threatened by crises of convertibility for its gold reserves were insulated by the discount rate and all foreign rates followed the British rate. The prominence of London’s credit drains led Keynes (1930) to write that the sway of London “on credit conditions throughout the world was so predominant that the Bank of England could almost have claimed to be the conductor of the international orchestra” (p. 306-307). Karl Polanyi in his renowned work the Great Transformation states “Pax Britannica held its sway sometimes by the ominous poise of heavy ship’s cannon, but more frequently it prevailed by the timely pull of a thread in the international monetary network” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 24).
Britain’s position waned due to inter-state competition, insufficient domestic investment, and World War I. Despite its economic weaknesses, British political sway continued after WWI, which led to the gold-exchange standard created under the Genoa Conference of 1922. This system failed, however, not only due to Britain’s incapability, but to the growing decentralization of the international monetary system with the rise of New York and Paris as financial centers that resulted in the collapse of the gold exchange standard in 1931. The Gold Exchange standard of the interwar period, as Kindleberger cogently stated, collapsed because "Britain couldn't and America wouldn't." In fact, Kindleberger provides a slightly different variation of monetary hegemony that possesses five functions rather than three defined here.
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